Authentication with Hiding
In many situations, it is desirable to authenticate data without revealing the data in detail. For instance, a party to a multilateral treaty might want to convince monitoring inspectors of the treaty that collected data represents a particular weapon type without revealing a detailed gamma spectrum of the weapon, which may in fact be classified. Even if the classified data can be kept private via an alternative representation, consistent correspondence between the classified and unclassified representations may reveal too much information about the weapon. As another example, the government may wish to utilize an information hiding mechanism to mitigate the concern of the private sector in providing proprietary information for national infrastructure protection.
Encryption alone cannot solve this problem. Additionally, certain data are prone to statistical variation, thus creating difficulties for consistent authentication results using standard digital authentication techniques. Gamma spectra are also examples of statistically variant data where measurements of the same sample with the same equipment will result in different spectra due to Poisson noise conditions.
Finally, public key cryptographic techniques are often useful in situations where one authenticating party seeks to convince multiple verifying parties or when the origination of data must be verifiable, thus providing non-repudiation.
The purpose of this LDRD will be to investigate digital public key mechanisms that can be used to authenticate data prone to statistical variation and to investigate techniques for hiding data details while still proving the authenticity and integrity of the data.
Problem Description
Although the weapon inspection problem will be used as the primary application of this work, other applications exist with a similar problem set. For example, the use of biometrics to enable or authorize a certain function such as entrance into a building faces similar challenges. A biometric reading from the same individual using the same equipment will likely be slightly different each time. Moreover, the use of biometric information may have privacy implications that drive the need for hiding the detailed biometric information itself.
Generally speaking, any authentication process will have two steps. The first step is to initialize the authentication system by acquiring a reliable template of the item in question. In the weapon inspection application, this will be a representative weapon from the class of treaty-limited items. In the biometric application, initialization requires verification of the individual using information such acquisition of the as a birth certificate, driver's license, fingerprint, or DNA sample, and initial biometric. The initialization step requires that the representative item (e.g., weapon or person) decertified to truly be amember of the said class. This generally requires additional off-line inspection processes that will not be discussed in this paper.
With the acquisition of an authentic template of monitored items, the system has been bootstrapped and can be used for subsequent inspections in the second part of the process. In the weapon authentication application, the basic problem is to make a class association as opposed to differentiating between individual weapons of the same class. In the biometric application, the original biometric is used as a template for subsequent authentication of the individual.
Related Work
An approach developed for use in biometric identification utilizes error correction coding techniques [DFM98] .
It uses majority coding to construct a template of a biometric that is known to vary between measurements.
Majority coding takes a number of measurements (preferably odd) and assigns each bit of the template to the value that is most often represented in the measurements using a majority rule. The template is then encoded into a code vector with a specified amount of redundancy. The amount of redundancy and the encoding technique used determines how many bits can be corrected in the template. In other words, if a vector does not perfectly match any codeword (template), then the closest codeword (in a Hamming sense) is generally assigned.
The distance between codewords is representative of the number of correctable bits as well.
During verification, the same majority coding technique is used to acquire a biometric representative from a number of measurements.
Since majority coding is a bit-oriented technique, the idea is to use it to acquire a representative test biometric. The hope is that it is within a specified Hamming distance of the original biometric template. If the representative is close enough to the template, it can be decoded into the exact biometric using bounded distance decoding.
A speech scrambling concept [SDM97] uses a data hiding technique that is very similar to the method described herein. The difference is that we constrain the input signal via scaling and centering prior to permuted transformation and they propose no authentication of the output signal. Scaling and centering of the input signal allows some very strong statements about the security of the algorithm to be proven. We show that independent of the permutation key and input spectrum, the output of the constrained permuted transform is consistent with a realization of Gaussian white noise. Hence, the distribution of the components of the output signal is substantially non-informative about the input signal.
Organization of the Paper
The remainder of this paper provides details of the approximate authentication with information hiding method referred to as the PTP algorithm, and illustrates how it might be applied to the weapon authentication problem. Section 2 provides an overview of the weapon authentication process and establishes the need for the PTP algorithm. Section 3 describes the PTP solution in detail, providing a numerical example of its use in gamma spectrum authentication.
Section 4 discusses the efficacy of the proposed procedure for data hiding and provides some operational guidelines for using the proposed method. Section 5 discusses its efficacy in preserving the ability to discriminate across classes. Section 6 provides a summary and gives information about the software available to utilize the PTP algorithm.
System Solution
The goals of a system solution for the problem of ensuring integrity of statistically variant data while maintaining privacy of the original data are twofold.
First, the system must allow authentication (ideally, integrity, identification, and non-repudiation) of the source of the data. Secondly, the system solution must not reveal any usable information about the original source data.
The approach was developed by the LDRD team and involves the retention of information in the original signal in a statistical sense while provably hiding the original data. This approach is very non-invasive in terms of allowing users to utilize the same statistical authentication measures and evaluations on the measured signal that are used without any information hiding. The algorithm for hiding the original data involves permuting the original signal, applying a linear transformation, and then permuting the transformed signal. Through this process, the output signal becomes essentially indistinguishable from Gaussian elements of the output signal or vector are completely uncorrelated.
Overview of the Weapon Authentication Process
white no;se. The individual In the weapon monitoring application, the host country is responsible for the inspected item while other parties to a particular treaty act as inspectors. The goal of weapon monitoring is to distinguish between different classes of weapons so that certain treaty-limited items can be tightly controlled.
In the two-step authentication process, the first step is to acquire a reliable template of the item under inspection.
This step is performed only once for each weapon class and results in a template or reference signal.
Step two of the authentication process involves acquiring a measurement of the inspected item for comparison to the reference signal.
In the weapon authentication application, a statistically variant signal is recorded and measured in similarity to the prerecorded template.
For example, the weapon's gamma spectrum must be statistically similar enough to a weapon-class template to be considered a member of the class. This process is shown in Given that the process shown in Figure 2 .1 provides authentication of the inspected item, information hiding of the original data signal must be added to qualify as an acceptable, secure system solution. The system shown in Figure 2 .2 provides information hiding of the original signal and outputs a signal that can be handled in much the same way as the original measured signal without information hiding. This is important because it may be possible to accommodate already familiar techniques for measurement of statistical similarity. 
The Permutation-Transformation-Permutation (PTP) Solution
The Permutation-Transformation-Permutation (PTP) solution to information hiding, as its name implies, performs 3 operations to the measured signal, after which the signal is completely unrecognizable from its original content. 
Permutation
The purpose of the permutation functions n and o is to scramble the signal Y such that (Y.W). can be made public without risk of revealing Y. Permutation operations are easily reversible if the permutation is known.
Therefore n and o must be kept secret. However, the root permutation function fo can be a standard secure hash function which need not be kept secret. Passcode CA and CD, uniquely associated with the Inspected Item, is entered by the Inspected Agent. Passcode CA (CB) is 'hashed and separated in;o n(m) equally representing a numeric value. The pieces are ranked numerically and permutation n (0). 
Transformation
The first task of the monitoring equipment is to produce a digital representation of the inspected item. .
W is an n x m transformation matrix with orthonormal columns that transforms the vector of measurements to ms n latent variables.
q o is a pernzutation of the integers from 1:m that is unique to a particular verification class.
Step 1: Center and scale-transform Y such that the mean of Y is O and the standard deviation of Y is 1. The scale transformation provides data normalization that renders the shape of the spectrum as being the sole identifying characteristic of a class.
Step 2: Permute the elements of Y: Y --+ Yfl. The idea is to permute the elements of Y before applying the linear transformation (W) so that each latent variable is constructed/composed differently for each verification class. The elements of Yare randomly re-ordered.
Step 3: Linearly transform the permuted spectrum via W YZ + Yz . W . The orthonormality of
W implies that
Other characteristics of the columns of W are assumed as follows:
w,
=O,'v'j>, i=l
For a given spectrum, we now have a sample space of n! unique sets of equally likely rn-vector.s (latent variables) that comprise T = Yz -W . The particular realization of T that arises (at random) depends on the distribution of intensities within Y and the permutation z (not, however, on the natural ordering of Y [Step 1 took care of that]). Due to (2) and the fact that that the mean of Y is zero, Tl = O. In general, due to characteristics (1) and (3), we can claim that for the jfẽ lement in T (Tj),
At this point, there is an association of the latent variable with its particular basis (a column of W). Depending on the size of m and the particular basis set that is used (e.g., m = n), T may be used to extract information about Yz (e.g., via WI). From Yz, one might obtain information about Y. Thus, one final step is needed to completely hide the original spectrum.
Step 4 Thus, over the class of possible permutations (mand @ for a particular spectrum, the elements of U are identically distributed. Note that as an alternative to this second permutation, it has been suggested that the Ts be sorted rather than permuted. Admittedly, this will result in a simpler procedure. The problem is that such a procedure will allow many other input spectra to be incorrectly authenticated (many to 1 mapping) as only the distribution of Ts is authenticated (as opposed to the distribution and order of Ts).
Candidate Transformation Matrices (W)
The restrictions on Ware that its columns and rows must be mutually orthonormal. In addition, we require There are a large number of candidates for W. Two possibilities for Ware discussed in detail here.
**See [L75] for details.
Normalized Hadamard Matrix
A Hadamard matrix, H, has elements H,l = {-1,+1}. The rows and columns of H are orthogonal.
The order of a Hadamard matrix, n, is restricted to 1, 2, or 4n where n = Z+. Thus, for example, the dimension of the gamma spectra (n = 128) is compatible with this restriction. Hfl has the property that For example, a Hadamard matrix of size 4 x 4 is
In order to obtain columns with length 1, we normalize
In order to achieve our target statistical properties of the transformed spectra, we replace the condition that
Wlj i=l with~= O. A lower bound for the number of unique Hadamard matrices of order n (when they exist for that order) is n!. This lower bound can be achieved by simply permuting the n unique columns (or rows) of H~, where Hfl is obtained via a standard construction in which all elements of the first column and row of H. are +1 (or -1 ). In general, the number of unique Hadamard matrices of order N is unknown [HSS99]. Constructions for Hadamard matrices are discussed in [HSS99] .
Note the uniqueness of the first column and row of the standardized Hadamard (all ones [or negative ones] ). Thus, the first latent variable will be zero by construction.
For more information, see ht@://www.astro. virRinia.edu/-eww6timaWHadmmdMattix.html.
3.3.1,2 Fourier Coefficients -Cosine/Sine Basis
Assume that the spectrum is size n, where n is even (there is a similar development when n is odd). One possible basis set consists of In order to obtain columns with length 1, we normalize
As in the case of the Hadamard basis set, note that the elements of the first column are constant.
Since;~= O, one latent variable will be zero by construction.
Example -Weapon Monitoring Application
In the weapon monitoring application, the host country is responsible for the inspected item and plays the role of the inspecting agent. The other parties to a particular treaty act as inspectors. The goal of weapon monitoring is to distinguish between different classes of weapons so that certain treaty-limited items can be tightly controlled. Therefore, there is no need to distinguish between individual weapons.
The monitoring system is initialized once for each class of weapon. During this step, a single weapon representing the entire weapon class is inspected using out-of-band means to acquire trust in the monitoring system from this time forward. If the initialization weapon is not a trustworthy representative of the weapon class, then subsequent inspections cannot be trusted either. During initialization, a class-specific passcode is entered to form the secret permutations within the monitoring equipment. The same passcode must be entered at all subsequent inspections of the same weapon class and the passcode must be kept secret. After initialization, the monitoring equipment can erase the passcode, the permutations, and the classified data from the weapon measurement so that it no longer holds any secrets. The output of the initialization process is an unclassified reference signal that the inspector can use for subsequent inspections of the weapon class.
During a routine inspection, the monitoring equipment acquires a measurement of the weapon, accepts a passcode from the host country, and outputs an unclassified inspection signal. The inspector can make a statistical similarity measurement between the inspection signal and the reference signal to arrive at an authentication result.
In the nuclear weapons verification area, gamma-ray spectroscopy can be used to uniquely identify weapon classes. The basis for this is the unique radio-isotopic/structural configuration of each weapon class. This gives rise to a characteristic gamma spectrum for each class. Spectra vary within a class due to manufacturing variation across units, the random nature of radioactive decay and measurement error. To illustrate the PTP method, 30 artificial gamma spectra were created. The spectra simulate the measurement (including Poisson counting errors) of 5 different gamma-emitting materials. Each material consists of a mixture of several radionuclides. Two counting times are assumed for each material. For each combination of materiallcounting time, there are 3 replicate spectra. The spectra, which have dimension n = 128, are displayed in Figure  3 .2. The complete data-hiding mechanism in this example is as follows. First, a spectrum is squareroot transformed on a pixel-by-pixel basis.
(Here, the square-root transformation is variancenormalizing.)
Next, the square-root transformed spectrum is centered (translated) and normalized such that its average value is O and standard deviation is 1. The resulting spectrum is then permuted (via a random permutation, z ) and transformed via a normalized Hadamard matrix (W=$HJ.
The first latent variable is identically zero by construction, because the first column of W is a constant and the average spectrum is zero. Since there is no information in the first latent variable it is deleted.
The remaining latent variables (m= 127) are permuted via a random permutation, 0. Figure 3.3(a.-g.) illustrates the step-by-step metamorphosis of an individual spectrum from its original state (Y) to its final PTP-state (U). Notice that, as expected from theory, the public version of the spectrum (Figure 3 .3g) is effectively indistinguishable from Gaussian white noise. .4 displays 5 output spectra that are the result of varying the permutation set {z, o } when constructing the output spectrum. These radically different output spectra were constructed by applying different random permutation sets (and W) to the spectrum in Figure  3 .3d. In the biometric application, individual people represent the inspected agent and the inspected item is some biometric (e.g., fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry, etc.) of the inspected agent. The passcode is analogous to a personal identification number (PIN) that is entered by the individual or is read from a badge held by the individual. The inspector in this application is in control of both the monitoring equipment and the reference templates.
Initialization of the biometric monitoring system occurs once for each individual person. During this step, trust in the individual is acquired using out-of-band means. Once trust is established, the individual's biometric is measured, the PIN is acquired and a reference signal is computed for use during subsequent authentication of the individual.
When a PIN is entered by an individual or via a badge, the monitoring equipment retrieves the appropriate reference signal, measures the biometric and tests the "hidden" biometric with the reference signal as a test of authentication. The biometric is hidden so a collection of reference signals can be stored on a server while maintaining privacy of the associated biometrics.
Distribution of PTP Output Elements
This section provides a discussion of the distribution of the PTP output elements both within and across verification classes. This discussion is important because it provides a foundation for demonstrating the difficulties in distinguishing verification classes via the PTP output. The first part of the section deals with the limiting normal distribution of the PTP output as n + co. The second part of this section illustrates that the normal distribution suggested via the asymptotic analysis is a very good approximation for n >100. With regard to satisfying the regularity conditions, one has to consider both the transformation matrix (W) and the input data vector (Y). For example, assume that W is a Hadamard matrix. In this case, forjzl:
Fk
Thus, in this case, the regularity conditions ( '2) and E(X; -X;)+ n-' E(X1 .Xq)=o n imply that
E(1~Y,) = o(l) and
The other regularity conditions EIX113<co and EIX,13= o(n-') require a certain amount of variety in the input spectrum. For example, in the gamma spectrum example, the spectral mass should be well spread out and not concentrated at a few channels.
The above result holds for any input spectrum Y and transformation matrix W consistent with the above regularity conditions and the specifications for W. The result does not depend on the verification class. Thus, in the limit for such spectra, T converges in distribution to Gaussian white noise as n + C=. The noise realization depends on Y and the permutation, z Thus, as n -+ 0=1, the distn"butions of T are indistinguishable across input spectra.
The second permutation, a simply permutes the elements of T and does not affect its distribution. Thus, the final PTP output (U) converges almost surely to Gaussian white noise as n + C=so that the distributions of U are classes.
indistinguishable across input spectra within and across
Next, we will demonstrate the distributional similarity of PTP output across permutations and a variety of simulated gamma spectra with n=l 28 channels. Figure 3 .7 displays the PTP output from a single input spectrum with 5 different sets of permutations.
The upper portion of Figure  3 .7 displays the 5 realizations of output while the bottom portion of the figure displays the empirical cumulative distribution functions of the PTP elements associated with each realization. The standard Normal (mean=O and standard deviation= 1) cumulative distribution is superimposed in black for comparison. Table 3 .1. If the distribution giving rise to FYZ.lJg(x) is F(x), then the expected values of the 50ti, 75ti, 90ti, 95ti , and 99ti percentiles of Dn.lJg are 0734, .0902, .1078, .1202, and. 1441 respectively. In general, the observed percentiles of&128 are less than their expected values, indicating a better than expected match between FJx) and F(x). The exception to this is the 9@ Percentile of D..128. This suggests that the difference between Fn(x) and F(x) is occasionally larger than would be expected if the distribution giving rise to Fn.lJg(X) is F(x). Almmt all PTP outputs derived from the simulated gamma spectra are indistinguishable from Gaussian white noise. In general, characteristics that influence the degree to which the PTP output elements resemble Gaussian white noise include the dimension of the spectrum n, and the distribution of intensities associated with the input spectrum, Y. For a fixed spectral shape, the PTP outputs tend towards Gaussian white noise as n increases. If the input spectral intensities are well distributed and not concentrated at a few pixels, the PTP output is likely to resemble Gaussian white noise. Such spectra are said to be well behaved.
So far we have focused on the distribution of PTP output elements in a gross sense. For finite n, in the case of simulated gamma spectra used as input, we have shown that it is difficult to distinguish the resulting PTP output from Gaussian white noise. However, at a micro level, the distribution of PTP output elements does depend on the input spectrum that is to be transformed.
For a fixed input spectrum over all possible permutations (mand g), there is a finite set of values possible in the PTP output. In this regard, the PTP output based on a sine/cosine construction is superior to output derived from a Hadamard-constructed PTP because the finite set of values in the former case is larger than the set of possibilities derived from the later case. The more limited set of possibilities in the case of the Hadamard construction is due to the restricted set of coefficients available in a Hadamard matrix (+1 or -1 ). The set of possible PTP output values varies from spectrum to spectrum. However, the variation of spectra within a class (e.g., due to unit-to-unit variation and measurement error) broadens the set of possible output elements considerably within a class.
Efficacy of the PTP Method for Data Hiding
The efficacy of the PTP method for data hiding is described in 2 contexts. In the first context, we discuss the ability of the PTP method to hide Y given that an adversary has a single output spectrum from a given class. In the second context, we discuss some possible vulnerabilities of the PTP method when an adversary has multiple output spectra from the same class.
Single Output Spectrum
It is clear that the second random permutation (c$ destroys any structure in the PTP output (U) so that the order of the elements of an output spectrum provides no information regarding the characteristics of the input spectrum. We argue that all residual information about Y within U is localized to the distribution (as a whole) of values within U. Thus, the information-containing aspect of U is limited to the distn"bution of its elements.
However, assuming that the candidate spectra are well behaved, the distributions of the elements of the U are approximately the same regardless of the particular spectrum that is transformed. In the limit, as n + co, the elements of U are independently and identically distributed according to a Normal distribution with zero mean and variance equal to 1 (Gaussian white noise). Thus, in this limiting case and without knowledge of z and a, a single PTP-output is completely uninformative about the character of the input spectrum (Y). This is the fimdarnental basis for claiming that the PTP method is an effective data-hiding mechanism.
In summary, the PTP transformation makes the distribution (in a statistical sense) of possible output vectors from one class indistinguishable from the distribution of possible output vectors from another class. The PTP transformation produces output that is essentially indistinguishable from Gaussian white noise. For a particular input spectrum there is a huge number of possible realizations of this Gaussian white noise process (e.g., when W is a normalized Hadamard matrix obtained by a standard construction there at least n! possible realizations).
The uniqueness of the output for a particular class is provided by the combination of the input spectrum, the input permutation, and the output permutation.
Despite the evidence about the lack of information concerning Y via U, it is interesting to consider possible ways to attack the PTP scheme (i.e., gain information about Y). A brute force attack would be to invert U via all possible permutations in conjunction with W1. There are at least 2 problems with this attack. First, the number of possible permutations could be enormous. It is believed that it would be computationally infeasible to compute all permutations for reasonably large n and m (e.g., 128! > 102M).
The second problem is more subtle. Suppose one were able to compute all possible versions of Y given U. Out of the huge number of possibilities for Y, we conjecture that just by chance there could be a very large number of feasible solutions. We conjecture that an attacker would have great difficulty in identifying the true value of Yfrom the feasible solutions. For example, Figure  4 .1 displays the first 64 channels of a simulated gamma spectrum.
Superimposed on this spectrum is a fixed line at 260 counts. Let S 1 be the sub-spectrum from the pixel denoted by a '*' to the pixel denoted by a 'o'. Let S2 be the sub-spectrum from the pixel denoted by a 'o' to the pixel denoted by a 'x'. Let S3 be the sub-spectrum from the pixel denoted by a 'x' to the pixel denoted by a '+'. The count values of the 4 highlighted pixels are the same except for measurement error. The 3 sub-spectra (S 1, S2, and S3) can be interchanged and reversed to form 23-3 ! spectra that have an underlying smooth nature (hence possibly feasible) and would be equally likely solutions for Y given U that is derived from the true Y. Figure 4 .2 displays one such result obtained by exchanging S 1 and S3 and reversing S 1. Note that the construction (e.g., isotopic composition) of systems giving rise to these spectra would be significantly different. There are numerous other ways to develop feasible spectra. Continuing with the notion that one could compute all possible versions of Y given U, a proposed attack involves finding the "smoothest" version of Y and using that version as the solution. To formalize, suppose that we have been able to reduce the candidate solution set to X which is a permutation of the true input vector. Consider the objective jimction:
where Y = XP is a permutation of X. The permutation of X that minimizes D produces a monotone non-decreasing (or non-increasing) set of values for Y (e.g., Yi= Xfi)). This can easily be proved by induction. The point is that the use of smoothness as a singular criterion for finding the true input vector may not be useful.
Multiple Output Spectra
Suppose that multiple output spectra from a single class are available to an adversary who is trying to obtain class-specific information about the input spectra. To formalize, consider the following 2 measurement error models.
Modell: Y=y+dand U=u+s 1. Y is the input spectrum as measured (not accessible by host or adversary).
2. y is an idealized input spectrum that is perfectly repeatable within a class.
3. 6 is the vector difference between the actual input spectrum and the idealized classspecific spectrum.
U = (Y= . W)
. is the public output of the PTP procedure applied to Y.
5. u = (yz "W)m is the hypothetical output of the PTP procedure applied to y.
6. s = (d=~W). is the hypothetical output of the PTP procedure applied to & Note that the only public observable is U (the output spectrum).
For this discussion, assume that Y is centered and scaled such that~r =1 and~= O. Also assume that W is n by n (i.e. there is no dimension reduction). Other assumptions are made concerning the elements of 4 denoted by d. where i= 1, 2, . . .. n. These assumptions are:
where the sample space spans all pixels of spectra within the same class. This broad sample space is considered due to the permutation, Z. It follows that E( 6.6:) = n" o:. Note that o;
could depend on the class and/or the measurement conditions.
In certain limits (e.g., well-behaved Y with large n), U is indistinguishable from Gaussian white noise (independent Gaussian elements with mean O and variance 1).
Via similar conditions on 6 one can argue that .s is indistinguishable from Gaussian white noise (elements with mean O and variance, By difference, it follows that u is indistinguishable zero mean and variance, 1-o;.
from a Gaussian white noise process with
Multiple observations of U for a certain class might be used to estimate cr~which can in turn be used to estimate a:. For example a reasonable estimate of a: is
J xx TnU,i-miy, '~= (~_ll).n ",=1 i.,
where T is the number of observations and u, is the average value of the iti pixel over the T observations. Based on i?:, a good estimate of a; is t?:= t?:. Thus, multiple observations of U can provide information on Var(@, which is a gross measure of the repeatability of Y across pixels and spectra.
In the case of the example involving gma spectra, a relatively large value for d: might suggest that the underlying gamma spectrum (prior to scaling) has relatively poor signal-to-noise quality. For example, consider the 6 simulated gamma spectra shown in Figure 4 .3. These spectra represent repeat measurements of the same material. Three of the spectra are associated with a simulated counting time of X, while the other 3 are associated with a counting time of 5X and thus have better signal-to-noise quality. These spectra (not square-root transformed) are centered and scaled prior to applying the PTP. (Also see Figure 4 .4. Clearly the spectra associated with a counting time of X are noisier.) Following the PTP operation, we observe U,i -~i (for each set of 3 spectra. Here we have used simulated measurements of the same class at different counting times to vary signal-to-noise quality. From repeated observations of U we were able to ascertain the relative signal-to-noise of the inputs. In practice, an adversary could analyze the repeated outputs from a fixed class to ascertain the relative signal-to-noise in the inputs. From that, an adversary might be able to deduce something about the magnitude of the underlying class-specific signal y (e.g., yyT) if there is a relationship between o: and yyT. However, even if s was available to the adversary, nothing about the shape of Y (or y) would be revealed, since mapping e to 6 is as difficult as mapping U to Y.
So far, we have assumed that~is unknown to the adversary. However, if fiis known or if an adversary had the ability to adjust Y (e.g., by adding a known perturbation) and observe the corresponding change in U, then the adversary could determine z and o even without knowledge of Y. Potential adversaries must not have the ability to affect Y. One way to defend against the adversary would be to vary the signal to noise in the original input spectra (prior to the normalization that results in I@ =1) from measurement to measurement. For example, one could accomplish this by varying the counting time. An assumption here is that the original input noise is only small part of the original total input signal. If that assumption holds, the magnitude of the resulting idealized spectrum is, after normalization, relatively unaffected.
Model 2: Y = y + d and U = u +s, the same as Model 1 except that the individual elements in d have different variances. This attack assumes that the measurement-error variances of the input channels are unique. The basic strategy of the attack is to do an eigenanalysis of a set of output spectra (Ul, U% .... UN) from a single class. If certainconditionsare satisfied, then each sign-transformed eigenvector is equivalent to a row of + 1n Wc. Given that there are n rows, one can guarantee that a row permutation of the matrix= WO exists within the set of 2~possible candidates (the set of possible candidates is due to the sign ambiguities of the eigenvectors). The search space is thus reduced from more than n ! candidates to one with 2" candidates. The search space can be further reduced greatly by utilizing the known form of the Hadamard matrix. Assume that the row permutation of the matrix~WC (say V =O(ZJW.) can be identified from the possible candidates. Now given a specific output spectrum (U), V can be used in conjunction with U to obtain a permuted version of the associated input spectrum (Y). That Thus, this attack can produce a permuted version of the input spectrum.
The following MATLAB code provides an example of how this might be done. % This attack obtains ROWS of the transformation % It uses many repeat observations (n=100 ) 
Except for asign(e.g., columns2, 4, 6, and 8), the original coh.mmsof EVformtherowsof W'. Here, due to the wide disparity invariance and relatively small dimension (n=8), we needed relatively few observationsto gettherowsofW.
Although this attackdoes reveal therowsofW, it does not (in general) reveal their ordering. Also note that thecolumnsofEV aretherowsofW sofiedby thestmdmd deviation of theemors intheinput vtiables (sd=[lOO lOOOlOOOOlOl .1 .01 .001]).
For example, the first column of EV is the third row of W corresponding to the location of the maximum element in sd (10000). The second column of EV is the second row of W corresponding to the location of the second largest element in sd (1000).
The rough argument behind this attack is that the uniqueness of the measurement-error variances of the input channels induces a correlation structure in the output channels.
To Thus, observed variation in the output channels Ujk is due solely to the variation in (YI.). The result is perfect positive correlation between output channels j and j' if Wjl = Wjl (concordant channels) and perfect negative correlation between these output channels if Wjl = -wjl (discordant channels). In the general case, an eigen-analysis of the sample covariance matrix of the output channels (n by n) could be used to extract the rows of W. The sample covariance matrix of the output channels is decomposed into n n-dimensional eigenvectors. In our example this analysis was accomplished via a singular-value decomposition of the mean-centered output spectra. A sample size (N) that is suitable for the degree of variance similarity across input channels is required (more similarity in variances requires a larger sample size). An element-by-element sign transform of each eigenvector will result in a vector that is equal to a column of W (to within a sign). It does not seem possible to resolve the sign ambiguity.
Note that the difficulty in implementing this attack increases as the channel variances become more homogeneous, the sample size (IV) decreases, and the dimension of the spectrum (n) increases.
In order to characterize the efficacy of this attack over a broad range of conditions, the following limited study was conducted. The degree of variance similari~was controlled by the functioñ =(l+~)i, i=l,2,.,., n, where Vt is the measurement error variance associated with the ifh input channel. For this study, the assumed distribution of the measurement errors is Normal. Larger values off impose greater diversity in variance and hence make the attack easier. When F O, this attack will not work even for an arbitrarily large replicate sample size. Values of n that were considered are in the set {8, 16, 32, 64, 128}. Replicate sample sizes considered (N) are in the set {10, 100, 1000, 10000}. For each value of~= {.025,.05,.1,.2, .5,1} and n we identified (in a rough sense) the minimal sample size that would allow a successful attack ( 10,000 10,000 10,000 1,000 100 100 n=32 >10,000 10,000 10,000 1,000 100 100 n=64 >10,000 10,000 10,000 1,000 100 100 n = 128 >10,000 10,000 10,000 1,000 1000 1000 *Smallest value of {10, 100, 1000, 10000} that will likely facilitate a successful attack. This is just a rough order of magnitude estimate. Note that a hard restriction is that the sample size must exceed n.
For any particular situation, the ratio of the largest variance to the smallest is (1+~)"-1. For example, for n = 128 and f = .025, this ratio is larger than 23. Thus, even with the amount of variance disparity in this case, more than 10,000 replicate samples would be successful attack. required to make a
Efficacy of the PTP Method for Class Discrimination
Suppose our test statistic is of the form
where Uj (new) represents the jth element of the PTP-spectrum from the item being evaluated and Uj (target) is thej'h element of the target PTP-spectrum. We conclude that the item is authentic if D < Dcr~~.
represents the test statistic that is computed when using the original spectra (Y) modified by
Step O. We conclude that the item is authentic if E < E,,jt. For this case we will also assume the following:
Theorem: For any real-valued n-dimensional spectrum (Y) and any permutations (z and o), E = D if W is symmetric orthonormal with dimensions n x n. Alternatively, we could specify that are signed permutation matrices (row and column, respectively).
The signed attribute of the permutation matrix makes this transformation somewhat more general than the case without it. 1 x m row vectors. Thus, D = (U~=W -U) (unew-uy =(Ynew-Y)w-wT (Yne,-Yy where W. W T is an n x n symmetric matrix, Let: 2. E be a m'-dimensional random variable with independent elements having approximately the same distribution as the elements of Y=W (e.g., normal mean zero and variance 1), and 3. s be a m'-dimensional random variable with independent elements having mean zero and variance a: of the order of the reproducibility of measurements within a class.
Characteristics of E and s are as follows: E is constant within a measurement class and variable across measurement classes. 1? could be a consequence of the seeds used to generate z and c or derived from another seed that is private to the host and specific for a particular class. s varies within a class from measurement to measurement (perhaps derived from yet another seed).
The net transmitted signal is of the form Z = [Y=W E+ S]O . Z has dimension m+m' with
approximately identically distributed elements (statistically indistinguishable). Thus, we have intermixed signals that are relevant to the measurements of the class YZW, irrelevant to the measurement but specific to the class (E), and irrelevant to the class (s). Without E, the inspector could compare transmitted signals (Z = [Y=W E])c and determine the positions of the elements of E. Of course, with the addition of s, there is some impact on discrimination performance. Thus, there is an inherent tradeoff between increased security (rn+m '>nz) and the ability to discriminate between classes (when o: >0). Naturally, the ability to discriminate decreases as a: increases.
Summary
Authentication is difficult because there is no inherent trust embodied in any created thing. In addition, approximate authentication is difficult because a consistent representation of the authenticated item is not available. The need to conceal details of the original signal such that an adversary cannot learn useful information about the original signal adds complexity to the underlying authentication objective. The PTP algorithm offers an information hiding technique believed to be usable in high security applications.
By design, this algorithm is such that the value of a simple Euclidean-distance authentication metric based on the PTP output will provide results that exactly match the value of the metric that is obtained by using the original input. Hence, authentication of a sensitive input signal can be achieved indirectly by authenticating the "non-sensitive" output signal.
The PTP algorithm has been demonstrated analytically and empirically to provide a high level of assurance that details of the original signal remain unknown and authentication is effective. For those interested in utilizing this algorithm in their own applications, MATLAB, Lisp, and C code is available from the authors.
In general, it is straightforward to quantify the conditional probability of Type I error in case A since the truth ("true weapon type is XX') is very well specified. In the case of Type II error in case B, the truth ("true weapon type is not XX") is not very well specified. Hence, quantification of Type 11Error is difficult in this case.
It has been proposed that the classification decision will be made on the basis of a scalar "statistic" or "metric" which is a measure of the similarity between the current and target spectra. Small values of this statistic indicate relatively good similarity. (In the limit, a value of zero is indicative of a perfect match.)
A threshold value for the statistic will be used for purposes of classification. When the statistic exceeds the threshold value, the weapon will be classified as "not XX." Otherwise, the weapon will be said to match the target. The selection of the particular threshold value will influence both Type I and Type II Errors.
In order to determine an appropriate threshold, measurements of the same weapon type could be repeated over normal variations of test conditions. A distribution of statistical values will follow. It is a straightfoma.rd process for using this distribution to select an appropriate threshold value that is consistent with a specified conditional Type I Error. Given this threshold, it is only possible to express the underlying Type 11 Error for a specific weapon type (say "YY") being sampled. The ability to discriminate between weapon types "XX" and "YY" will obviously depend on "YY" and the threshold value.
In this context, note the relationship between Type I and Type 11Errors and the threshold value. As we increase the threshold value, the probability of a Type I Error will decrease and the probability of a Type II Error will increase.
Also note that the discussion to this point has been limited to conditional probabilities of misclassification. Unconditional probabilities of misclassification depend on the population of items to be tested (e.g., how often does the host try to fool the inspector).
Finally, all of this easily extends to other applications (e.g., biometrics). 
